Paying for Suffering: The Problem of Human Experimentation by Palmer, Larry I.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1997
Paying for Suffering: The Problem of Human
Experimentation
Larry I. Palmer
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1997 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Palmer, Larry I., "Paying for Suffering: The Problem of Human Experimentation" (1997). Faculty Publications. Paper 533.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/533
Essay 
PAYING FOR SUFFERING: THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN 
EXPERIMENTATION 
lARRY I. pALMER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Several years ago, I had the privilege of working with David Feld-
shuh and Daniel Booth, colleagues of mine at Cornell University, in 
the production of an educational video, Susceptible to Kindness: Miss 
Evers' Bcrys and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. 1 The video examines the eth-
ical issues raised by the infamous experiment, the Tuskegee Study of 
Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male (Tuskegee Study).2 David Feld-
shuh's award-winning play, Miss Evers' Bays/" is a fictionalized account 
© Copyright 1997 by Larry I. Palmer. 
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. AB., HaJVard University; LL.B., Yale Univer-
sity. This Essay is a revision of the 1996 Stuart Rome Lecture on Law and Ethics, delivered 
on Aprilll, 1996 at the University of Maryland School of Law. 
On May 16, 1997, President Clinton formally apologized on behalf of the federal gov-
ernment for the Tuskegee Experiment. See john F. Harris & Michael A Fletcher, Six De-
cades Later, an Apology: Saying 'I Am Sorry,' President Calls Tuskegee Experiment 'Shameful,' 
WASH. PoST, May 17, 1997, at A1, available in 1997 WL 10693767. Five of the eight living 
victims of the Experiment attended the White House ceremony. See id. The President told 
them: "We can stop turning our heads away, we can look at you, in the eye, and finally say, 
on behalf of the American people, what the United States government did was shameful, 
and I am sorry." /d. 
1. SusCEPTIBLE To KINDNESS: Miss EVERS' BoYS AND THE TusKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY 
(1994) [hereinafter SuscEPTIBLE TO KINDNESS]. 
2. See FINAL REPORT OF THE TusKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY An Hoc PANEL TO THE DEPART· 
MENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE (1973) (hereinafter FINAL REPORT OF THE Tus. 
KEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY]. 
The Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male was a forty-year 
study (1932 to 1972) conducted by the United States Public Health Service to 
document the long-term effects of syphilis. The study tracked some 400 men 
from Macon County, Alabama, by charting their health via annual medical exams 
and by performing autopsies on the more than 100 men who died over the course 
of the study. The men were never told that they were subjects of a study, nor were 
they ever told the exact nature of their disease. 
The subjects, mostly tenant farmers in rural Macon County, were originally 
gathered to receive free medical treatment. 
LARRY I. PALMER, STUDY GumE FOR DiscussiON LEADERS, SusCEPTIBLE TO KINDNESS: M1ss 
EVERS' BoYS AND THE TusKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY (1994) (accompanying the video). For a 
detailed account of the study, see jAMES H. JoNEs, BAD BLOOD: THE TusKEGEE SYPHILIS 
EXPERIMENT (1993). 
3. DAVID FELDSHUH, Miss EVERS' BoYS (1995). 
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of the Tuskegee Study,4 which was conducted by the United States 
Public Health Service from 1932 to 1972.5 Daniel Booth, a filmmaker, 
created the juxtaposition of selected scenes from a performance of 
Miss Evers' Boys at Cornell University, interviews with commentators, 
historical film footage, music, and photographs, which became the 
"text" of our prize-winning video.6 I was the executive producer and 
author of the written study guide that accompanies the video. 7 The 
educational video and study guide focus on a number of issues, in-
cluding personal and professional ethics, the relationship between law 
and medicine, and the social forces of race, gender, and economic 
status in shaping what may be right or good when power and authority 
are variously defined. 8 
The selected tide, Susceptible to Kindness, serves as a metaphor for 
the human tragedy of the Tuskegee Study. The metaphor comes 
from a scene near the end of the play, Miss Evers' Boys, in which Miss 
Evers is testifying before a United States Senate Committee consider-
4. The play was inspired by David Feldshuh's reading of jones's Bad Blood: The Tus-
kegee Syphilis Experiment, joNES, supra note 2, and other primary sources about the Study 
during his completion of his residency training in emergency medicine. Feldshuh had 
previously earned a Ph.D. in theater. The protagonist of Feldshuh's play, Miss Evers, is 
based on a real public health nurse, Eunice Rivers, whose voice and photograph are a part 
of the video. See SusCEPTIBLE TO KiNDNESS, supra note 1. The other characters in the play 
are four African-American tenant farmers; Dr. Douglas, a Caucasian public health physi-
cian; and Dr. Brodus, the African-American head of the hospital at Tuskegee Institute. 
FELDSHUH, supra note 3. The play premiered at the Center Stage in Baltimore, Maryland in 
November 1989 and has been performed at many theaters throughout the country. Miss 
Evers' Boys won the Gerald R. Dodge Foundation's New American Play Award in 1989 and 
was nominated for the Pulitzer Prize in 1992. Home Box Office (HBO) produced a film 
version of the play, which originally aired on February 22, 1997. The play was first pub-
lished in American Theatre in November 1990. See David Feldshuh, Miss Evers' Boys, 7 AM. 
THEATRE, Nov. 1990 (special pull-out section). 
5. See FINAL REPORT OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY, supra note 2. 
6. The video won four awards: a CINE Golden Eagle in 1994 as a "documentary"; a 
Gold Plaque Award in the "Politics, Society, and Government" category in the Interna-
tional Communication Film & Video Festival, INTERCOM '94; Best of Category, "Issues 
and Ethics" in the International Health & Medicine Film Festival, 1994; and a Silver Apple 
in "The Health Issues and Ethics" category in the 1995 National Educational Media 
Competition. 
7. See PALMER, supra note 2. The text of the study guide was a commentary on the 
artistic creation of Daniel Booth. Collaborating with two artists seeking to contribute to 
the public discourse on human experimentation required me to use "literary imagination." 
See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC jUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 2-3 
(1995) (positing that the imagination writers use to create literature will guide societal 
development because their ideas will be read by and affect the minds of judges, legislators, 
and policymakers). As noted in the study guide: "The educational value of Miss Evers' Boys 
lies in the intersection between the moral vision within the play and the very strong reac-
tions of those who view the play as a description of social or inner reality." PALMER, supra 
note 2, at 3. 
8. See PALMER, supra note 2, at 11-20. 
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ing legislation concerning research on human subjects.9 Justifying 
her role in the forty-year Study, Miss Evers declares: "I loved those 
men .... [they] were susceptible to kindness." 10 
The Tuskegee Study reappears periodically in public discourse, 
most recently in 1995 when President Clinton's nominee for Surgeon 
General, Dr. Henry Foster, Jr., was alleged to have participated in the 
StudyY Dr. Foster's critics, and even some scholars, have questioned 
whether he knew of the Tuskegee Study when he was a practicing phy-
sician in Tuskegee in 1969. The nagging questions about Dr. Foster 
suggest that there are important lessons to learn from reexamining 
the Study, even twenty-five years after a panel of experts made recom-
mendations that they believed would prevent future abuses of patients 
or subjects. 12 
The Tuskegee Study acts as precedent even though there is no 
traditional case law involving the Study. 13 Tuskegee's legacy is 
9. FELDSHUH, supra note 3, at 93. 
10. Id. at 97. 
11. See jONES, supra note 2, at 209 (stating that as early as February 1969, during Dr. 
Foster's vice presidency of the Macon County Medical Society, the organization voted 
unanimously and without comment to refer the Study to the Macon County Health Depart-
ment); Foster Quiz.zed on Tie to Experiment, CoM. APPFAL (Memphis), Feb. 25, 1995, at 2A, 
available in 1995 WI.. 26421 06; David L. Kirp, Blood, Sweat, and Tears: The Tuskegee Experiment 
and the Era of AIDS, TIKKUN, May 1995, at 50, available in 1995 WI.. 12580337; Lisa Nevans, 
Foster Says Race Plays Part in Attacks, Finds Pattern in Opposition, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1995, 
at A1, available in 1995 WI.. 2558782. Although the Family Research Council, based solely 
on Jones's account, charged Dr. Foster with knowledge of the Study, a member of the 
Council conceded that jones's book neither places Dr. Foster at that meeting nor claims 
that he was aware of the experiments. See Foster Didn't Knuw Anything About the Tuskegee 
Experiment (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 25, 1995). Moreover, Fred Gray, attor-
ney for the subjects, has stated that his investigation did not indicate that Dr. Foster had 
any knowledge of the Study while it was being conducted. See id. 
12. See FINAL REPORT OF THE TusKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY, supra note 2, at 23-47. 
13. Society seems to have accepted that something "bad" happened during the Tus-
kegee Study, but some scholars have taken great literary license with the facts. For in-
stance,Jack Kevorkian, the outspoken proponent of legalizing physician assistance in dying 
and a longtime advocate of allowing experimentation on prisoners condemned to death, 
stated the following about the Tuskegee Study: 
The wartime medical crimes [referring to the Nazi concentration-camp experi-
ments] were one result. The ethical sickness had spread to the United States 
even before World War II, but evidence of it surfaced only after the war, when in 
1981 a horrible experiment on syphilis in Tuskegee, Alabama, was described in 
detail. It involved a nontherapeutic study of 399 syphilitic black prisoners and 201 
uninfected black prisoners who served as "controls." None of the subjects was 
asked their consent or knew what was happening. 
jACK KEvORKIAN, PRESCRIPTION MEDICIDE: THE GoODNESS OF PLANNED DEATH 170 (1991) 
(citations omitted). In his zeal to argue the inadequacy of the modem code of ethics for 
human experimentation, Kevorkian might have ignored the difference between tenant 
farmers and prisoners in describing what in fact happened in the Tuskegee Study. 
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grander because it was a stimulus to the current model of regulating 
human experiments-the "institutional review board" 14-and the pre-
vailing model of professional ethics, which is grounded in a subject's 
consent. 15 Within this model, monetary compensation is often prof-
fered as a solution after a subject is injured or killed in the course of 
human research, 16 or when it is discovered that an individual did not 
consent to being the subject of human research. 17 Mter a lawsuit was 
filed in 197 4,18 the federal government agreed to compensate the sub-
jects of the Tuskegee Study. 19 Examining the terms of this settlement 
will make society less willing to embrace the concept that paying for 
suffering resolves the deep public policy issues that human experi-
mentation presents. 
The Tuskegee legacy has also helped to shape the latest govern-
ment report on human experimentation, the Final Repmt of the Advi-
sory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. 20 This Report suggests 
Another explanation for the creative license taken with the facts of the Tuskegee 
Study is that issues associated with race are easily distorted. See NussBAuM, supra note 7, at 
93-97 (discussing the effects of a reader's race on his ability to judge Bigger Thomas's 
thoughts and actions in Richard Wright's Native Son). Feldshuh, for instance, has men-
tioned in conversations with this Author that he has encountered African-American actors 
who have stated categorically that the government actually "gave" syphilis to the tenant 
farmers in Macon County. 
14. See generaU.y 42 U.S.C. § 289 (1994) (providing that any entity applying for a federal 
government biomedical research grant for studies that use human subjects must establish a 
review board "to protect the rights of the human subjects of such research"). 
15. See ARTHuR CAPlAN, IF I WERE A RICH MAN CouLD I Buv A PANcREAS?: AND OTHER 
EsSAYS ON THE ETHICS OF HEALTH CARE 94 (1992) (listing the duties of research institutions 
to obtain informed consent from human subjects); jAY KATz, THE SILENT WoRLD OF Doe-
TOR AND PATIENT 59-84 ( 1984) (discussing the development of informed consent); LARRY I. 
PALMER, LAw, MEDICINE, AND SociALJusnCE 43-44 (1989) (discussing the social and legal 
importance of informed consent); DAVID J. RoTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HIS-
TORY OF How LAw AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 93 (1991) 
(describing the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) definition of informed consent 
and its historical origins). 
16. See Student's Death Is Linked to an Anesthetic, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1996, at B4. A 
nineteen-year-old volunteer in a study on the effects of smoking and air pollution died 
after an accidental overdose of topical anesthetic during a lung test. See id. The woman's 
family said it planned to file a $100 million lawsuit against the hospital. See id. 
17. See Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 716-18 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (finding 
that pregnant women were unknowingly administered diethylstilbestrol (DES) as part of a 
university study of the drug's effectiveness in preventing miscarriages). 
18. See Plaintiffs Complaint, Pollard v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 304 (M.D. Ala. 
1974) (No. 4126-N). 
19. See joNES, supra note 2, at 217-19. 
20. FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HuMAN RADIATION ExPERIMENTS 
(1996). 
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that Congress should provide monetary damages to unknowing par-
ticipants in studies conducted over the last fifty years. 21 
Given the specifics of the Final Report of the Advisory Committee on 
Human Radiation Experiments, it is apparent that the legal response to 
the Tuskegee Study provided the Radiation Committee with a frame-
work in which monetarily compensating "victims" of modern medical 
progress is accepted as the appropriate governmental response.22 De-
spite the similarity between the government's response to the Tus-
kegee Study and the Human Radiation Experiments, providing 
governmental compensation to victims is only one of several alterna-
tive responses to the persistent public policy problem of human ex-
perimentation.23 In fact, other responses must be considered as we 
move toward a conceptualization of the appropriate social functions 
of science, medicine, and law. 
In reviewing the Tuskegee Study for institutional lessons, com-
mentators must resist the prevailing view that the physicians and scien-
tists involved in the Study were bad or even racist; this view blinds 
scholars to the ineffectiveness of our present legal response to human 
experimentation.24 Although society may not be susceptible to the 
kindness of a caring public health nurse such as the fictionalized 
Nurse Evers,25 it may be susceptible to a religious-like faith in medical 
progress and legal utilitarianism when confronting human suffering.26 
I. THE TUSKEGEE STUDY: COMPENSATION BY SETrLEMENT 
Mter the Tuskegee Study became the subject of media reports, 
Fred Gray, who has had a long history of involvement in civil rights 
21. ld. at 512. The Radiation Committee recommended financial compensation for 
the subjects (or their surviving immediate family members) for whom the experiments 
provided no prospect of direct medical benefit or who had been misled into believing that 
controversial interventions were actually standard practice. Id. at 513. Furthermore, the 
Committee recommended that the compensation be adequate to cover relevant medical 
expenses and associated harms, including pain and suffering, loss of income, and disabil-
ity. Id. 
22. See FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY CoMMITTEE ON HuMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 178-88. 
23. See CAPlAN, supra note 15, at 70-99; jAY KATz, ExPERIMENTATION WITH HuMAN BE-
INGS: THE AUTHORITY OF THE INVESTIGATOR, SUBJEGr, PROFESSIONS, AND THE STATE IN THE 
HuMAN ExPERIMENTATION PROCESS 248-52 (1972); RoTHMAN, supra note 15, at 248. 
24. See Statement by Committee Member Jay Katz, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY CoM· 
MITTEE ON HuMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 20, at 849-56 (criticizing current 
regulation of human experimentation); see a1.5o PALMER, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing the 
need to understand the relationship of health care to economic resources as a means to 
avoid "simplistic perspectives on our present health care crisis"). 
25. FELDSHUH, supra note 3. 
26. See CAPlAN, supra note 15, at 243; KATZ, supra note 23, at 598. 
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litigation,27 filed a lawsuit on behalf of the survivors of the Study and 
the heirs and representatives of the participants who had since died. 28 
With the assistance oflawyers from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,29 
Gray named as defendants the United States Government, the United 
States Public Health Service, the United States Center for Disease 
Control, the United States Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare, Department officials in their professional capacities, the State of 
Alabama, a private foundation, and individual physicians working for 
the United States Public Health Service.30 
The complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Alabama, alleged that the defendants' conduct vio-
lated the constitutional rights of the survivors and the deceased par-
ticipants in the experimentsY The complaint also requested that 
each survivor or decedent representative be awarded $1.5 million as 
compensation for the deprivation of their constitutional rights.32 
Gray's legal theory was that the tenant farmers selected for the 
Study by the Public Health Service were chosen solely because they 
were Mrican Arnerican.33 As a consequence of this reasoning, Gray 
did not name as defendants any of the Mrican-American physicians or 
nurses involved in the Study.34 Under Gray's conception, the victimi-
zation of these Mrican-American nurses and physicians by a racially 
27. Gray is well known as the lawyer who represented Rosa Parks, whose arrest precipi-
tated the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955. See Parks v. City of Montgomery, 92 So. 2d 683 
(Ala. Ct. App. 1957). 
28. See Plaintiffs Complaint, Pollard v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 304 (M.D. Ala. 
1974) (No. 4126-N). 
29. See id. at 14. 
30. See id. at 1-2. 
31. See id. at 12. 
32. See id. Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages for deprivation 
of rights under color of law. See Plaintiffs Complaint at 2, Pollard (No. 4126-N). 
33. See Plaintiffs Complaint at 10-11, Pollard (No. 4126-N). Paragraph 13 of the Com-
plaint stated: 
I d. 
The subjects of the study were racially selected: only black men were used as 
subjects in the study. . . . Plaintiffs allege that the black subjects were selected and 
used in the experiment, a program of controlled genocide solely because of their 
race and color in violation of their rights, secured by the Constitution and Laws of 
the United States. 
34. ld. at 1. In his book, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, james jones writes: 
The Tuskegee Institute, for which Gray served as the general counsel, was not 
named in the suit. Neither was the Veterans Hospital. The local health depart-
ment and the Macon County Medical Society also escaped legal notice. In fact, 
no predominantly black institution was named in the suit. The same was true of 
individuals; all of the individually named defendants were white. No black physi-
cians were mentioned; neither were any black nurses. 
joNES, supra note 2, at 216. 
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segregated medical profession and society mitigated their legal culpa-
bility. 35 He believed that race had a greater explanatory force than 
notions of professionalism, which might have encompassed both the 
Caucasian and Mrican-American professionals over the forty-year pe-
riod of the Study.36 Mter numerous pretrial maneuvers, the lawyers 
for the plaintiffs and the United States Government reached a mone-
tary settlement in which each surviving subject received $37,500, each 
heir or representative of a deceased subject received $15,000, each of 
the "controls" received $16,000, and the heir or representative of each 
control received $5,000 from the $10 million settlement paid by the 
federal govemment.37 
In retrospect, Gray's theory of racial selection as the starting 
point for a legal analysis of human experimentation seems unwise. 
His theory fails to account for the importance of institutional arrange-
ments as an explanation of what happened to his clients38-the Cau-
casian public health physicians named as defendants in the lawsuit 
relied upon Mrican-American physicians to refer syphilitic patients to 
the Public Health Service for over forty years.39 These Mrican-Ameri-
can physicians should at least be viewed as co-investigators, rather 
than as anonymous Mrican-American professionals victimized by "the 
system."40 Were any of these local physicians subject to suits for mal-
practice based on their failure to offer penicillin as a treatment option 
after it was discovered to be a cure for syphilis?41 Although the "lack 
o-: informed consent doctrine"42 had not yet been developed,43 the 
lingering questions about Dr. Foster44 and one of Feldshuh 's fictional 
characters in Miss Evers' Bays, Dr. Brodus,45 help to shed light on how 
the dynamics of science and medicine influence professional perspec-
tives on the ethics of using human subjects. 
35. See jONES, supra note 2, at 216. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. at 217. 
38. See NEIL K. K.oMESAR, IMPERFECf ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, 
ECONOMICS, AND Pusuc Poucv 210-15 (1994) (describing institutional analyses of race-
related issues). 
39. See joNES, supra note 2, at 114-15, 136-38. 
40. See id. at 14447. 
41. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 23 (noting that physicians are bound to treat patients 
based upon the level of knowledge, care, and skill of an average physician in similar cir-
cumstances); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 183 (criticizing the explanation of the 
Study's doctors for failing to treat syphilis with penicillin after 1945). 
42. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
43. See KATz, supra note 15, at 59-80 {stating that the lack of informed consent doctrine 
took form in the late 1950s). 
44. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
45. See supra note 4. 
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A. Good People, Bad Institutional Arrangements? 
In a scene from the play, Miss Evers' Bays, Dr. Brodus, the adminis-
trator and head of the hospital at the Tuskegee Institute, examines 
one of the men in the Study-one of Miss Evers' Boys-in 1946 after 
penicillin had been discovered.46 Both Nurse Evers and Dr. Douglas, 
the Caucasian physician from the United States Public Health Service, 
are present and participate in various conversations about whether, 
after fourteen years, the men should be given the choice of using pen-
icillin for their advanced stages of syphilis.47 On the one hand, Dr. 
Brodus is somewhat of a modem hero when he questions Dr. Douglas 
about the desirability of allowing the men to decide for themselves 
whether to take the risks of using penicillin for their advanced 
syphilis. 48 On the other hand, when he is questioned by Nurse Evers, 
Dr. Brodus uses a form of racial and professional paternalism to justify 
continuation of the Study without telling the men about the availabil-
ity of penicillin.49 When Nurse Evers pleads on behalf of the tenant 
farmers, Dr. Brodus shouts back in anger: "You think you're the only 
person who feels? You got your burden and I got mine. You serve the 
race in your way. I serve it in mine. I can't rock the boat while I'm 
trying to keep a people from drowning."50 
It is apparent that Dr. Brodus is concerned about future funding 
for his hospital, one of the few resources of modem health care for 
African Americans in his community. He is also concerned about his 
role as a research scientist to his liberal (by mid-1940s standards) col-
league, Dr. Douglas. 5 1 It is also apparent that Dr. Brodus has a highly 
individualistic vision of his social role. While some commentators in 
the video, Susceptible to Kindness: Miss Evers' Bays and the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study, see Dr. Brodus as caught up in the system, others sug-
gest that the socioeconomic difference between him-an educated 
professional-and the patients-illiterate tenant farmers- prevents 
him from seeing the possible harm to the individual patients.52 In 
some respects, Drs. Brodus and Douglas are like many modem profes-
sionals-unable to sort out how the mixture of personal and profes-
46. FELDSHUH, supra note 3, at 71-77. 
47. /d. 
48. /d. act II, sc. vii. 
49. /d. 
50. /d. 
51. The fictional Caucasian doctor, Dr. Douglas, was based upon Dr. John Cutler, Pro-
fessor Emeritus at the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public Health and a 
physician in the United States Public Health Service from 1947 to 1967. Dr. Cutler served 
as one of the commentators in our video. See PALMER, supra note 2, at 22. 
52. FELDSHUH, supra note 3, at 97. 
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sional ethics, and perhaps professional ambition, influences their 
decisions. 
The four hundred African-American males involved in the Tus-
kegee Study were originally gathered at the beginning of the Great 
Depression to receive free medical treatment for syphilis.53 The 
United States Public Health Service and a private philanthropy cre-
ated a partnership54 to bring some measure of health care to rural 
African Americans in the then-prevailing practice of fee-for-service 
medicine.55 The individual within the Public Health Service who de-
cided that monitoring the men was appropriate once foundation 
funds were no longer available is unknown. In the play, Miss Evers' 
Bays, Dr. Douglas is at least idealistic in the sense that he tries to save 
the treatment program in 1932 after the funds are withdrawn.56 He is 
professionally committed to providing health care services to the most 
underserved population of his day. 5 7 For many years, no one among 
his professional colleagues questioned the appropriateness of Dr. 
Douglas's actions. Although no moral conflict is apparent in Dr. 
Douglas's character, if we try to imagine ourselves in a totally segre-
gated society, would any of us necessarily have experienced moral con-
flict at the time? 
The fictional Nurse Evers helps us to recall that prior to the dis-
covery of penicillin, syphilis was classified as a "chronic illness."58 At 
that time, popular culture had not yet become infused with the mod-
em notion that every human affliction, such as cancer, multiple scle-
rosis, lupus, diabetes, and AIDS, is subject to cure. Currently, new 
treatments that prolong life or ameliorate the symptoms of those with 
chronic illnesses only reinforce the notion that a cure is just around 
the comer. Research on diet, violence among youth, or the Ebola 
viius in Zaire only encourages the belief that science can stop these 
epidemics and provide solutions to these current plagues. 
It would be a mistake simply to focus on Nurse Rivers because of 
her continuity with the Tuskegee Study or because her role has been 
artistically immortalized through the character of Nurse Evers in Miss 
Evers' Bays. Trying to imagine the ethical dilemmas from her perspec-
53. See joNES, supra note 2, at 116-19. 
54. In the early 1930s, the Julius Rosenwald Fund provided the funds necessary for 
determining whether syphilis was treatable. See id. at 54-60. 
55. See id. 
56. FELDSHUH, supra note 3, act I, sc. v. 
57. Mrican Americans and other minority groups are still underserved by the medical 
profession today. See Miriam Komaromy et al., The Role of Black and Hispanic Physicians in 
Providing Health Care for Underseroed Populations, 334 NEw ENG.]. MED. 1305, 1305 (1996). 
58. FELDSHUH, supra note 3, act II, sc. ii. 
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tive does, however, shed light on the institutional arrangements 
among science, medicine, gender, race, and law over time. 
Our ethics-starved modem minds reason that the discovery in the 
1940s of penicillin as a cure for syphilis required public health offi-
cials to provide treatment to all of the men in the Tuskegee Study. 
For those public health workers who had labored for years to provide 
some care to the medically neglected, however, the miracle drug had 
yet to be tested in the reality of medical practice in the rural America 
of the Deep South-a reality that would today be labeled as a problem 
of "access" to health care services. For the public health care workers 
servicing a portion of the public not yet infused with the dreams of 
scientifically based medicine, the risks of penicillin loomed much 
larger than its benefits. 59 This wholly paternalistic vision of the profes-
sionals' right to decide the hard ethical questions for "their" patients 
was not incompatible with the ethos of the entire profession prior to 
the mid-1960s.60 
B. Institutional Lessons 
The first lesson to learn from the Tuskegee experiment is a cau-
tionary one. Before commending or condemning professional behav-
ior, we should better understand the forces, particularly the 
conceptions of knowledge, that drive professional behavior. One of 
these forces is the belief that understanding the nature of disease and 
its transmission helps determine the optimal use of health resources.61 
We all benefit from continued drug research; in plain terms, we now 
know that penicillin and other antibacterial drugs change the nature 
of bacteria, which requires new antibacterial drugs. Today, the meth-
ods for investigating the effectiveness of drugs and disease progression 
involve research on viruses, bacteria, and genes using methodologies 
that were simply unknown sixty years ago. Research may involve using 
certain populations to aid scientists' efforts to isolate the molecular or 
genetic nature of breast cancer or alcoholism, for example, or to de-
termine why some isolated populations have certain incidences of dis-
ease.62 Because of the nature of scientifically based medicine, 
research involving human subjects will continue. 
59. See joNES, supra note 2, at 8. 
60. See ROTHMAN, supra note 15, at 101-26. 
61. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 8. 
62. See, e.g., jonathan E. Kaplan eta!., Workup on the Waoron~ NAT. Hisr., Sept. 1984, at 
68 (discussing isolated South American natives who apparently are free from cancer and 
heart disease); Craig D. Rose, Taking Aim at Asthma Secrets: Sequana, Canadian Team Seeking 
to Unlock Genetic Code in Work with Isolated Population, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 22, 1994, 
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Perhaps we have become so accustomed to the possible health 
care benefits of genetic research that we sometimes fail to understand 
the complex ethical dilemmas associated with modem scientific re-
search. The recently reported higher incidence of diabetes among 
Mrican Americans63 led to speculation that there may be a genetic 
"cause" of diabetes.64 In our zest to find cures in these discoveries, 
alternative explanations-for example, that the high incidence of dia-
betes is due to environmental conditions of the fetus and thus corre-
lates with the mother's social and economic status-are nearly 
drowned out of public discourse.65 Compared with the ethical quan-
daries of biotechnological developments, the Tuskegee Study, in ret-
rospect, appears simple. 
The other lesson for science and medicine is easy to state, but 
difficult to explain. Most scientists and professionals are ambivalent 
about the relationship of race to their work. The Tuskegee research-
ers wanted to know if syphilis took a different course in Mrican Ameri-
cans than in Caucasians.66 Lurking underneath that line of inquiry 
was whether biological differences among races meant that the medi-
cal response to the individual patient should consider this demo-
graphic factor. Lest we label as "racists" the researchers who might 
have asked those questions, we should recall how reluctant modem 
scientists are to admit that forensic DNA data are kept by race67 or 
at C1, available in 1994 WL 5443636 (discussing isolated island population with an ex-
tremely high asthma rate). 
63. See Sarah L. Roberts, Cracking the Code, DIABETES FoRECAST, Aug. 1994, at 60, 60. 
64. Great advancement in the understanding of the genetic nature of diabetes has led 
to the production of genetically engineered human insulin. See RoBERT PoLlACK, SIGNS OF 
LIFE: THE LANGUAGE AND MEANINGS OF DNA 110 (1994). Such advancements, however, 
can raise serious concerns: 
I d. 
In the absence of clear legal boundaries, we are at risk of developing a de facto 
national eugenics policy after all, not because we wish to identify and then elimi-
nate people as undesirable members of "lesser races," but because some alleles 
will be considered undesirable by organizations in a position to limit their 
replication. 
65. See id. at 9. 
66. See joNES, supra note 2, at 27-28. 
67. After a DNA sample is obtained and matched to that of a criminal suspect, the final 
step in compiling forensic DNA evidence is to determine the statistical probability that the 
crime scene sample came from someone other than the suspect. See Ranajit Chakraborty & 
Kenneth Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic Woffl, 254 Sci. 1735, 1736 ( 1991). Each 
band in the sample is measured for its frequency of occurrence within a database com-
posed of persons of a given race; these databases are composed of samples from hundreds 
of unrelated individuals subdivided by ethnic group, such as Caucasian, African American, 
and Hispanic. See People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 736-37 (Ct. App. 1992); People v. 
Simpson, No. BA 097211, 1995 WL 313118 (Cal. Super. Ct LA County 1995); People v. 
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that the debate about the social policy implications of race continues 
today.68 
Finally, the Tuskegee experiment sends a clear message to law-
yers: they must become "reflective practitioners"69-active legal 
minds that continually question the institutional frameworks that are 
brought to problems.70 Like most lawyers trained in the common law 
tradition, Fred Gray, in his representation of those harmed by the 
Tuskegee Study, was not equipped with an institutional analysis that 
would have allowed him to consider science and medicine as powerful 
institutional forces. Gray may not even have considered whether the 
growth of medicine and science might require the development of 
new legal concepts. He might not, for example, have considered 
whether naming individual practicing physicians, who happened to 
have been African American, as defendants might have enhanced his 
Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 658 (Co. Ct. 1988), affd, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197 (App. Div. 1992), 
affd, 633 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1994). 
In 1991, a debate arose-within the scientific community as to whether databases 
should be maintained by narrower racial categories. Under the Lewontin and Hartl "sub-
structuring" theory, the three broad, homogeneous populations named above do not mate 
randomly, influencing their degree of genetic variation. See Richard C. Lewontin & Daniel 
L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Furensic DNA Typing, 254 Sci. 1745, 1747 (1991). Accord-
ingly, genetic databases of Hispanics, for example, must be subdivided into groups such as 
Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. This controversial hypothesis was quickly debunked, see 1A 
U.S. DEPT. juSTICE, FBI REP., VNTR PoPUlATION DATA: A WoRLDWIDE STUDY 2 (1993); 
Chakraborty & Kidd, supra, at 1738-39, and abandoned by its original proponents. See 
Daniel L. Hard & Richard C. Lewontin, DNA Fingerprinting Report (Letter), 260 Sci. 473 
(1993). Citing the FBI study, a California court held that substructuring has a negligible 
effect on forensic DNA statistical evidence. See People v. Soto, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 859 
(Ct. App. 1994); see also Paul B. Tyler, The &Uy-Frye "General Acceptance" Standard Remains the 
Rule fur Admissibility of Nooel Scientific Evidence, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1274, 1288-1300 (1995) 
(discussing the debunking of the theory that substructuring affects DNA probability 
estimates). 
Contrary to its purely scientific facade, the compilation of DNA evidence is prone to 
various subjective forces. Determining which racial databases will be used and presented 
to juries, based on the probability that the suspect will be of a particular race, involves 
speculation and, most likely, social prejudice. See Barry C. Scheck, DNA and Daubert, 15 
CARoozo L. REv. 1959, 196466 (1994). Further, the laboratory tests themselves are not 
foolproof; as many as 1 in 25 "match" reports are false positives. SeeJonathanJ. Koehler, 
Error and Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA Evidence at Trial, 34JuRIMETRicsj. 21, 26 
( 1993). Nonetheless, a recent Gallup telephone poll suggests that 77% of adults ( theoreti-
cally representative of potential jurors) believe that DNA blood tests are "very reliable" or 
"somewhat reliable" in matching blood to an individual, and only 8% thought the tests 
were "somewhat" or "very unreliable." See Gallup Poll, Survey 9/18/94 to 9/20/94. 
68. See, e.g., RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MuRRAY, THE BELL CuRVE: INTELLI· 
GENCE AND ClAss STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN UFE (1994) (discussing the provocative hypothe-
sis on the correlation of race and intelligence). 
69. See DoNALD ScHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER (1983). 
70. See PALMER, supra note 15, at 125-37; Larry I. Palmer, Research with Human Subjects As 
a Paradigm in Teaching, 16 LAw, Mw. & HEALTH CARE 183, 183-84 (1988). 
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clients' position for settlement. He did not have a theory of the re-
sponsibility of individuals for the institutional arrangements in which 
they operated. Most significant, Gray did not consider whether his 
role as general counsel to the Tuskegee Institute might have blinded 
him to a theory of organizational responsibility for the harm to his 
clients.71 His theory of the role of race is perhaps understandable in 
our post-1960s optimism, in which courts are the primary public pol-
icy makers on racial matters. 72 
Lawyers who were crafting settlements and drafting legislation in 
the aftermath of the public outrage over the Tuskegee Study might 
have operated without a conception of the relationship of law to the 
institutions of modern science and medicine. 73 Such an institutional 
conception is all the more necessary today, when modern medical re-
search, particularly in its quest for the genetic understanding of 
health and disease, has heightened the ability of professionals to "play 
the God Game" because of patients' faith in medical progress.74 
The Tuskegee Study raises questions beyond the obvious ethical 
impropriety of not obtaining informed consent for a study involving 
human subjects. That is, we need to consider whether the medical 
and legal professionals involved in the Study were in fact "good" indi-
viduals who were unable to see that they practiced under "bad" institu-
tional arrangements. We must refocus on the Tuskegee Study to learn 
how legal encounters with human experimentation can help us to de-
vise the best institutional arrangements between law, medicine, and 
modern science. 
II. THE REGUlATORY MODEL 
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis Under the National Research Act 
Another legal legacy of the Tuskegee Study is legislative. Mter 
Senate hearings on the Study, Congress passed the National Research 
71. See joNES, supra note 2, at 216. 
72. The Supreme Court's approval of the executive branch's detention of people of 
Japanese ancestry during World War II might have made Gray a little less optimistic about 
the Court's ability to remedy the political effects of racial prejudice. See K.orematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also KoMESAR, supra note 38, at 202-03 (suggesting in 
his critique of the World War II race cases that courts were unable or unwilling to stop the 
executive branch from interning). 
73. See Larry I. Palmer, Life, Death, and Public Policy, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 161 (1995) 
(reviewing KoMESAR, supra note 38). 
74. See RoTHMAN, supra note 15, at 247-62 (discussing the relationship between the 
regulation of medical research and patient trust in physicians and hospitals); see also KATZ, 
supra note 23, at 185-91 (discussing the authoritative status and high degree of autonomy 
accorded to professionals in a technologically advanced society). 
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Act of 1974.75 The Act left two clear, permanent marks on the na-
tional discourse regarding the use of human subjects. First, and most 
significant, the Act authorized the United States Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare to issue regulations governing feder-
ally funded research. 76 The pillar of this regulatory system was the 
institutional review board and its supposed capacity to supervise the 
giving of consent.77 Under this system, the members of the institu-
tional review board would assist the investigator in her cost-benefit 
analysis to determine whether the use of human subjects was appro-
priate.78 Without this institutional assurance, federal funds for the 
proposed research would be denied. 79 Current regulations governing 
federally sponsored research evolved from the authority granted 
under the Act. 80 
The second feature of the Act was the establishment of the Na-
tional Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects, designed to 
advise Congress and the executive about policies regarding the use of 
human subjects.81 Although the Commission's mandate has ex-
pired,82 similar groups have become a feature of our national political 
life.83 "Commissioning Ethics" became a political compromise be-
tween those who sought specific legal restrictions on physicians' and 
scientists' use of human subjects and those who opposed such 
restrictions. 84 
B. Adjudication After Political Equilibrium 
Formation of a multidisciplinary group to address a cns1s in 
human experimentation does not require congressional action.85 In 
75. Pub. L No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 
300aaa-13 (1994) ). 
76. 42 u.s.c. § 212. 
77. !d. 
78. !d. 
79. ld. 
80. See FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY CoMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 108. The regulations cover research sponsored by federal agencies and 
research at institutions receiving federal grant support. See id. Thus, all university-spon-
sored research is covered by these regulations. See id. Research performed by private com-
panies not receiving government support is not necessarily covered by the regulations. See 
id. Similarly, the regulations do not govern research conducted by United States citizens 
outside of the United States. See id. 
81. 42 u.s.c. §§ 201-211. 
82. See H.R. REP. No. 102-478, at 66 (1992). The Commission was established by Con-
gress in 1974 and went out of existence in 1978. See id. 
83. See id. at 67-100. 
84. See RoTHMAN, supra note 15, at 168-89. 
85. See id. at 189. 
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January 1994, following numerous media reports of secret govern-
ment experiments, President Clinton issued an executive order estab-
lishing the most recent Advisory Committee on Human Radiation.86 
When President Clinton announced in October 1995 that he had re-
ceived the Final Repart of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Ex-
periments,87 we learned officiallyB8 of other government-sponsored 
research involving patients and research subjects. The Committee's 
Report chronicled the fifty-year history of experiments on the effects 
of human radiation, and like previous government reports on human 
experiments, it recommended that the government pay the individu-
als who were unknowing participants in government-sponsored scien-
tific experiments.89 This payment would not be for the physical harm 
caused by the experiment, but rather for the "indignity" of being ex-
perimented upon without consent. 90 In effect, the Committee asked 
itself: "Should we compensate those who suffer for medical progress?" 
and answered the question with a resounding, if somewhat lengthy: 
"Yes." 
I have no objection to Congress's enacting legislation to provide 
financial compensation to some of the subjects of government-spon-
sored human radiation experiments. Government compensation, 
however, should not be a complete bar to individual recovery. Polit-
ical solutions, ultimately, are compromises in any sense, but we should 
recognize the imperfections of previous political solutions, such as the 
National Research Act of 1974.91 In a separate individual statement, 
one member of the Radiation Advisory Committee, Jay Katz, who was 
also a member of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Ad Hoc Study Panel, 
expressed his disappointment with the failure to develop a national 
policy on the use of human subjects.92 Katz's doubts about the capac-
ity of institutional review boards within research organizations to re-
86. See Kenneth R Feinberg, Radiation and Responsibility, WASH. PoST, Oct. 19, 1995, at 
A23, available in 1995 WL 9267889. 
87. FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY CoMMITTEE ON HuMAN RADIATION ExPERIMENTS, 
supra note 20. 
88. The information about the alleged radiation experiments had been known for 
some time, but there was no official government recognition of how widespread the prac-
tice might have been. Id. at 502-04. Congress compensated some of the individuals in-
volved in radiation experiments sponsored by the CIA Id. at 513-14. 
89. ld. at 512. 
90. ld. at 512-13. The Commission's Report contains recommendations ranging from 
issues of record keeping on human experimentation to providing Congress and the execu-
tive access to information on special actions. ld. at 512-40. 
91. Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 
300aaa-13 (1994)). 
92. See Statement by Committee Member Jay Katz, FINAL REPORT oF THE ADVISORY CoM-
MITTEE ON HuMAN RADIATION EXPERtMENTS, supra note 20, at 547. 
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solve policy conflicts is symptomatic of a larger societal problem.93 
The political equilibrium94 we have achieved on human experimenta-
tion is fragile and subject to disruption by public events, such as the 
media report of secret government radiation experiments.95 
Although revelations of past human experimentation may bring me-
dia attention and congressional hearings, they do not necessarily pro-
duce new legislation or court opinions that change the present 
structure. Legislation enacted in the aftermath of the Radiation Advi-
sory Committee's Report should leave open the possibility of individ-
ual lawsuits. 
The litigation surrounding the radiation experiments at the Uni-
versity of Cincinnati General Hospital warrants close attention be-
cause it tells a story about modem human subject research.96 First, 
although it has been known for some time that radiation experiments 
took place for many years at Cincinnati General Hospital, until re-
cendy the identities of the patients were not known.97 One might as-
sume that the connection of these experiments to military efforts and 
professional notions of confidentiality may have cloaked the subjects' 
93. See id. 
94. The phrase "political equilibrium" is borrowed from William N. Eskridge, Jr. and 
Philip P. Frickey. See WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CAsES AND MATERIALS 
ON LEGISlATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF Pusuc Poucv (1988); William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Forew(JT'd: Law As Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 27 (1994) 
[hereinafter Law As Equilibrium]. 
95. Cf Eskridge & Frickey, Law As Equilibrium, supra note 94 (discussing the disruption 
of political equilibrium by events such as war and controversial Supreme Court decisions). 
96. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995). In these 
studies, which were conducted at Cincinnati's General Hospital from 1960 to 1972: 
[R]esearchers from the University of Cincinnati College of Medicine exposed 87 
mostly poor, African-American cancer patients to whole-body radiation with up to 
300 rads for roughly an hour-the equivalent of 20,000 chest X rays and enough 
to cause more than half the patients to experience nausea, vomiting, abdominal 
pain, and mental confusion. Documents show that the study, funded in part by 
the Department of Defense, was designed to estimate how effective soldiers could 
be after an atomic bomb explosion. 
Carol Pogash, Chain Reaction, CAL. LAw., Mar. 1995, at 48, 50-51. 
At the time of publication of this Essay, the parties in the Cincinnati Radiation Litigation 
were considering a proposed settlement in the class action suit. See Tim Bonfield, Holdouts 
Call Deal Far from Adequate, CIN. ENQUIRER, Feb. 22, 1997, at B1, available in 1997 WL 
5438066. The proposed settlement involved giving $33,000 to $66,000 to each family. See 
id. The children of three of the radiation experiment subjects opposed the settlement. See 
id. 
97. See In re Cincinnati Radiation, 874 F. Supp. at 804. The complaint alleged that until 
a newspaper reporter revealed the names of some of the subjects in January 1994, the 
plaintiffs' counsel had no way of knowing whether their representatives had been subjects 
in radiation experiments. See id. 
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identities in a veil of secrecy. Clearly, medicine's connection with the 
military war efforts skewed the "ethics" of physicians.98 
Second, most of these subjects were "poor," some were charity 
cases, and most were Mrican American.99 There is some similarity be-
tween the legal theories used by the plaintiffs in the Cincinnati lawsuit 
and the complaint filed after the Tuskegee Study in that they both 
alleged violations of constitutional rights. 100 
The trial judge in In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation101 denied 
the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. 102 I wonder, how-
ever, if the trial judge who refused to dismiss the complaints brought 
on behalf of the deceased, indigent, and mostly Mrican-American pa-
tients might have been motivated by another feature of modern 
medicine-the tendency to forget its harms or its failures. Those who 
died from cancer twenty years ago at the University of Cincinnati Hos-
pital, 103 for instance, are of little historical interest because we believe 
that they would have died regardless of our actions, 104 and because we 
claim to have learned lessons from our mistakes that will benefit fu-
ture patients. 
One wonders if society has become so accustomed to human re-
search that it has accepted a view of medical progress grounded in 
notions of "cure" and "death." Given the advances of biomedical re-
search, it is hard to imagine that there is harm and suffering that has 
been hidden from public view, such as in the Tuskegee and Human 
Radiation Studies. Perhaps individual lawsuits by actual victims are 
reminders that the harms of modern scientific medicine are notal-
98. See, e.g., TRIALS OF WAR CRJMINAI.S BEFORE THE NuERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAlS 
UNDER CoNTROL CouNCIL LAw No. 10 (1948) (demonstrating the most infamous example 
of this-the war crimes trial brought against Nazi doctors who conducted experiments 
upon concentration camp inmates against their will); see also KATZ, supra note 23, at 292-
306 (providing excerpts from record of war crimes trials in which Nazi physicians were 
prosecuted for conducting medical experiments without subjects' consent). There is now 
growing evidence that the key expert on medical ethics for the United States "skewed" the 
facts about experiments on prisoners in the United States during World War II. See jon M. 
Harkness, Nuremberg and the Issue of Wartime Experiments on US Prisoners, 276 JAMA 1672 
(1996). 
99. See Plaintiffs Complaint at 8, 10-11, Pollard v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 304 
(M.D. Ala. 1974) (No. 4126-N). 
100. See In re Cincinnati Radiation, 874 F. Supp. at 804. Plaintiffs alleged violations of 
their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. There are also differ-
ences between the cases in that In re Cincinnati Radiation alleged specific common law 
claims and claims based on federal statutes. See id. at 805. 
101. 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995). 
102. Id. at 807. 
103. !d. at 800-01. 
104. See jONES, supra note 2, at 207 (applying this theory to the Tuskegee Study). 
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ways immediately visible. Sometimes the harm from powerful and 
otherwise beneficial drugs is intergenerational; the litigation over di-
ethylstilbestrol (DES) is one such example.105 At other times, the so-
cial context of medicine does not allow individual physicians and 
scientists to see individual harm, as in both the Tuskegee and Human 
Radiation examples.106 For instance, determining whether radical 
surgery for certain cancers is more beneficial than the alternatives re-
quires years of longitudinal studies. 
We should explore the relevant competence of adjudicative, legis-
lative, administrative, and market processes to deal with the problem 
of human experimentation.107 Market forces-medicine, science, 
and how individuals respond to them-are the predominant forces 
that shape whether investigators view the risks to human subjects as 
worth taking.108 Administrative or legislative responses to problems of 
human experimentation are likely to be dominated by the forces of 
medicine and science as illustrated by the National Research Act of 
1974.109 Thus, judicial decisionmaking in human experimentation 
should aim to shape the institutional processes of medicine and sci-
ence by recognizing its own limitations. An individual lawsuit such as 
In re Cincinnati Radiation gives only a skewed distribution of the possi-
ble harms and benefits of atomic research. 110 The regulatory 
processes developed over the past twenty years to deal with human 
experimentation might actually have increased the amount of human 
experimentation, as well as the growth of new cures and greater life 
expectancy. There is also the concomitant growth in the possibility 
for individual pain and suffering. Perhaps nothing so blatantly shock-
ing as the Tuskegee Study would happen now, but other such events 
105. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (alleging plaintiffs suf-
fered in utero injury from their mothers' use of DES); Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 
198 (N.Y. 1991) (alleging plaintiff suffered injury as the grandchild of a woman who had 
used DES). 
106. See generaUy George J. Annas, Questioning Jqr Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal and Self-Decep-
tion in Postmodem Medical Research, 12J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 297 (1996) (explor-
ing the evolution of rationales used by physicians to justify experimentation on their 
patients). 
107. See generaUy Nestor M. Davidson, Constitutional Mass Torts: Sovereign Immunity and the 
Human Radiation Experiments, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 1203 (1996) (discussing the Human Radi-
ation Experiments as an example of a type of constitutional mass tort for which judicial 
abrogation of sovereign immunity is appropriate). 
108. See Palmer, supra note 73, at 175. 
109. See FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY CoMMITTEE oN HuMAN RADIATION ExPERIMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 543. 
110. See KoMF.SAR, supra note 38, at 177-95. 
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are happening and will again happen. m This is why institutional 
analysis is so critical. 
It is difficult to judge the effects of the post-Tuskegee regulatory 
scheme. I do not believe that the problem is seen as determining the 
optimal amount of human experimentation. Neither legislative nor 
adjudicative processes are very good at determining how much 
human experimentation is socially desirable, although each might of-
fer some incentives or disincentives towards optimization. Despite the 
reports on human experimentation, we have not yet developed an ad-
equate institutional analysis of human experimentation because our 
quest has been a search for bad professionals rather than bad institu-
tional arrangements. The search for bad professionals is perhaps a 
job for the legislature, if it would ever consider imposing criminal 
sanctions for certain types of human experiments. 112 It is unlikely 
that criminal sanctions are going to be enacted in this country, as we 
are all so dependent upon physicians. 113 The hope is that law will 
create incentives for modern physicians to see themselves as institu-
tionally embedded. Were physicians to see themselves as so embed-
ded, their educational system would offer them opportunities to 
explore the ethical nexus between law, medicine, and science as they 
constantly revisit the challenges of modern medicine, including the 
effect of the changing social and economic context.114 
111. See generaUy Leonard W. Schroeter, Human Experimentation, the Hanford Nuclear Site, 
and judgment at Nuremberg, 31 GoNz. L. REv. 147 (1995-1996) (discussing the development 
of law regarding human radiation experimentation). 
112. The "crime against humanity" from the Nuremberg trial, for instance, has never 
been enacted into domestic law. Furthermore, in the few instances in which prosecutors 
have tried to use existing homicide statutes to question physicians' actions regarding pa-
tients, courts have established high barriers to criminal liability. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior 
Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 488-89 (Ct. App. 1983) (expressing the court's disappointment 
with the legislature's inaction to provide a proper framework for deciding ethical medical 
issues); see also PALMER, supra note 15, at 99-107 (discussing the recent unsuccessful at-
tempts in California to prosecute criminally physicians for removing a life-support system 
from a critically ill patient). 
113. See KATz, supra note 15, at 209 (explaining the intense bonds that patients unilater-
ally form with their doctors). 
114. SeeP ALMER, supra note 15, at 42-43. Ten years ago, the hospital was the most impor-
tant organizational structure for physician practice. See id. at 42. Most people, even mem-
bers of the medical community, considered hospitals as simply places where doctors 
treated patients. See id. With greater recognition of the role of the hospital as a forum for 
research came safeguards against the moral risks inherent in human research. See id. at 43. 
With the advent of managed care, the social and economic structure of medicine is under-
going radical change that requires a rethinking of the traditional model of patient consent 
as the ethical imperative of modem practice. 
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CoNCLUSION 
Despite being battered by revelations of secret, government-spon-
sored human experiments, we continue the marriage of science and 
medicine without examining whether, within our faith in the present 
paradigm, there are dangers to ourselves and our loved ones that 
should be faced through appropriate legal response. When con-
fronted with abuses in the human experimentation process, legally 
trained individuals have asked: "Should we compensate?" As this Es-
say suggests, that may not be the correct question for developing mar-
ginally better social responses. 
The response to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study demonstrates that 
the core public policy issue that Congress, courts, and institutions of 
higher education will have to address is the relationship between sci-
ence and medicine. The questions that must be asked about the 
human experimentation process must be different from those posed 
by the Committee on Radiation and its predecessor commissions. 
Regardless of whether Congress and the various federal agencies 
respond effectively to the Radiation Committee's recommendations, 
at least one lawsuit will serve as a means of portraying this tragic part 
of our history. Whatever damages might be awarded through adjudi-
cation or settlement, we should resist our institutional biases as legally 
trained persons to be satisfied with paying for human suffering.U5 We 
need thorough institutional analyses of law, medicine, and science so 
that law can minimize the amount of human suffering that comes in 
the name of medical progress.116 
Lurking in the shadow of our current paradigm of paying victims 
for their unknowing conversion into research subjects is the idea that 
money should at some point overcome our moral revulsion to using 
individuals as instruments of progress. The idea is shameful on a 
number of counts and is not an ethos that we wish to leave as our legal 
legacy. Put in these terms, it should make us think of the real prob-
lem with the concept of paying for suffering: pain and suffering are 
not quantifiable and are not comparable among individuals. On what 
basis, then, can these victims' suffering ever be given monetary value? 
It might well be that paying the victims, as we continue to do, perpetu-
ates the cycle of loving people because they are susceptible to 
kindness. 
115. The pain and suffering metaphor from tort law is having more influence in the 
physician-assisted suicide debate. Physicians have started to discuss their obligation to fight 
against pain just as they once argued that they should fight against death. See Palmer, supra 
note 73, at 169. 
116. See KoMESAR, supra note 38, at 53-97. 
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